

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA  
COUNTY OF MERCED

2260 N Street, Merced  
627 W. 21<sup>st</sup> Street, Merced  
1159 G Street, Los Banos

Wednesday, July 3, 2024

**NOTE: Merced Superior Court will no longer be consolidating Courtroom 8 and Courtroom 10.**

**Tentative Rulings are provided for the following Courtrooms and assigned Judicial Officers with scheduled civil matters:**

**Courtroom 8 – Judge Pro Tem Peter MacLaren**

**Courtroom 9 – Commissioner David Foster**

**Courtroom 12 – Hon. Jennifer O. Trimble**

**Courtroom 10 will continue to post separate Probate Notes that are not included in these tentative rulings.**

**IMPORTANT: Court Reporters will NOT be provided; parties must make their own arrangements. Electronic recording is available in certain courtrooms and will only be activated upon request.**

**The specific tentative rulings for specific calendars follow:**

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA  
COUNTY OF MERCED

Unlimited Civil Law and Motion  
Judge Pro Tem Peter MacLaren  
Courtroom 8  
627 W. 21<sup>st</sup> Street, Merced

Wednesday, July 3, 2024  
8:15 a.m.

The following tentative rulings shall become the ruling of the court unless a party gives notice of intention to appear as follows:

1. You must call (209) 725-4111 to notify the court of your intent to appear.
2. You must give notice to all other parties before 4:00 p.m. of your intent to appear.

Per California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1), failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral argument. *Note:* Notifying Court Call (the court's telephonic appearance provider) of your intent to appear does not satisfy the requirement of notifying the court.

**IMPORTANT: Court Reporters will NOT be provided; parties wanting a hearing transcript must make their own arrangements.**

Case No.	Title / Description
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20CV-02055	Harold Johnson, Senior v. Juan Ramirez, et al.
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Demurrer by County of Merced to First Amended Complaint on the grounds that the first amended complaint fails to state a cause of action because each cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations provided in Government Code § 945.6(a)(1), and that in addition, the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Causes of Action fail to state a statutory basis for those claims, the Third Cause of Action fails to allege a caretaking or custodial relationship, and the Fourth Cause of Action fails to state a claim because the County of Merced is not a person for purposes of Penal Code § 496.

**The unopposed Request for Judicial Notice by Defendant County of Merced pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(c) and (d) of (1) the December 5, 2022, Order on Midway's Motion for Compelling Ricky Johnson to Withdraw as Counsel for the Trust of Harold Johnson Sr., dismissing the Doe Amendments on the Court's own motion and ordering Ricky Johnson to Withdraw as counsel; (2) The November 24, 2021, Claim by Harold Johnson Sr.; (3) The January 10, 2022, Notice of Action of Claim; and (4) the July 28, 2024, Doe Amendment is GRANTED.**

**The unopposed Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint on the grounds that the first amended complaint fails to state a cause of action because each cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations provided in Government Code § 945.6(a)(1) is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. This Court takes judicial notice of the Claim that was filed November 24, 2021, and rejected January 10, 2022. Two weeks after the statute**

of limitations expired, a Doe Amendment was filed on July 28, 2022, but was stricken on December 5, 2022.

**The unopposed Demurrer by Defendant County of Merced to the First Amended Complaint's First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Causes of Action for failure to state a statutory basis for those claims is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to allege a statutory basis for the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Causes of Action.**

**The unopposed Demurrer by Defendant County of Merced to the First Amended Complaint's Third Causes of Action for financial elder abuse for failure to allege a care taking or custodial relationship is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.**

*Demurrer* by Defendant South Dos Palos County Water District to First Amended Complaint and each cause of action therein for (1) failure to comply with the Government Claims Act, (2) failure to allege a statutory basis for liability, (3) failure to state a claim not barred by the statute of limitations, (4) fail to allege a cause of action for private nuisance by a public agency; and a demurrer for uncertainty for failure to state facts establishing a grounds of liability against any public agency.

**The unopposed Demurrer by Defendant South Dos Palos County Water District to First Amended Complaint and each cause of action therein for (1) failure to comply with the Government Claims Act, (2) failure to allege a statutory basis for liability, (3) failure to state a claim not barred by the statute of limitations, (4) fail to allege a cause of action for private nuisance by a public agency; and a demurrer for uncertainty for failure to state facts establishing a grounds of liability against any public agency is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.**

Motion to Stike by Defendant South Dos Palos County Water District to First Amended Complaint to strike (1) Prayer for Treble Damages, (2) Entire complaint for failure to be signed by counsel of a represented plaintiff pursuant to CCP § 128.7, (3) striking damages paragraphs for failure to timely file a government claim, and (4) striking the entire complaint as untimely pursuant to Government Code § 945.6(a)(1).

**The unopposed Motion to Stike by Defendant South Dos Palos County Water District to First Amended Complaint to strike (1) Prayer for Treble Damages, (2) Entire complaint for failure to be signed by counsel of a represented plaintiff pursuant to CCP § 128.7, (3) striking damages paragraphs for failure to timely file a government claim, and (4) striking the entire complaint as untimely pursuant to Government Code § 945.6(a)(1) is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.**

Demurrer by Defendant Central California Irrigation District to the First Amended Complaint's First Cause of Action for Trespass failure to state a statutory basis for such claim and failure to comply with the Government Claims Act; to the Second Cause of Action for Private Nuisance for failure to allege a statutory basis and failure to comply with the Government Claims Act; to the Third Cause of Action for Financial Elder Abuse for failure to allege a statutory basis and failure to comply with the Government Claims Act; to the Fourth Cause of Action for Violation of Penal Code § 496(c) for failure to allege a statutory basis and failure to comply with the Government Claims Act; to the Fifth Cause of Action for Negligence for failure to allege a statutory basis and failure to comply with the Government Claims Act; to the Sixth Cause of Action for conversion for for failure to allege a statutory basis and failure to comply with the Government Claims Act;

and to the Ninth Cause of Action for Injunctive Relief for failure to state an underlying claim to which an injunction is an appropriate remedy.

**The unopposed Demurrer by Defendant Central California Irrigation District to the First Amended Complaint's First Cause of Action for Trespass failure to state a statutory basis for such claim and failure to comply with the Government Claims Act; to the Second Cause of Action for Private Nuisance for failure to allege a statutory basis and failure to comply with the Government Claims Act; to the Third Cause of Action for Financial Elder Abuse for failure to allege a statutory basis and failure to comply with the Government Claims Act; to the Fourth Cause of Action for Violation of Penal Code § 496(c) for failure to allege a statutory basis and failure to comply with the Government Claims Act; to the Fifth Cause of Action for Negligence for failure to allege a statutory basis and failure to comply with the Government Claims Act; to the Sixth Cause of Action for conversion for failure to allege a statutory basis and failure to comply with the Government Claims Act; and to the Ninth Cause of Action for Injunctive Relief for failure to state an underlying claim to which an injunction is an appropriate remedy is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.**

Demurrer by Midway Community Services District to Entire Complaint for (1) failure to allege compliance with the Government Claims Act, (2) Failure to allege a statutory basis for any claim; and (3) for uncertainty for failure to allege a basis for liability by Defendant Midway Community Services District.

**The unopposed Demurrer by Midway Community Services District to Entire Complaint for (1) failure to allege compliance with the Government Claims Act, (2) Failure to allege a statutory basis for any claim; and (3) for uncertainty for failure to allege a basis for liability by Defendant Midway Community Services District is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.**

**Plaintiff is ordered to file a Second Amended Complaint addressing the issues identified above by September 3, 2024.**

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22CV-00567                      Jeg Livingston Ranches LLC v. Pfre I LLC, et al.

Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

**The unopposed Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel filed by Counsel for Defendant Pfre I LLC is GRANTED, effective upon proof of service of notice of entry of order on Defendant Pfre I LLC.**

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22CV-01467                      Edgar Navarro v. Winton School District

Motion for Summary Judgment

**To hold a public entity liable for a dangerous condition on public property, Plaintiff bears the burden that there was a dangerous condition at the time of injury, the dangerous condition posed a foreseeable risk to the plaintiff, and the entity had actual or constructive knowledge of the supposed dangerous condition. (Government Code § 835;**

*Moncur v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Airports* (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 118, 123.) Plaintiff's failure to prove that a dangerous condition did exist at the time of the alleged injury is grounds for summary judgment. (*Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp* (2013) 220 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 994, 999; *Cerna v. City of Oakland* (2008) 161 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 1340, 1347.) Where a Plaintiff slips, but is unable to explain why the Plaintiff slipped, such as the result of an "unknown substance or an improperly waxed floor", summary judgment is appropriate. (*Buehler v. Alpha Beta Company* (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 729, 732; *Burton v. Security Pacific Na. Bank* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 972, 978.) It is important to note, that the failure to establish a triable issue of fact as to why the floor was dangerous is also instrumental in proving that employees of the entity were negligent in failing to identify that a dangerous condition existed and take some manner of corrective action. Here, the sole evidence presented is that the Plaintiff was unaware of whatever substance was on the floor, and believed that the floor was improperly waxed because it was clean and shiny.

Defendant has provided Undisputed Facts 1-13 in support of the motion for summary adjudication of the first cause of action for premises liability and Undisputed Facts 14-30 in support of the motion for summary adjudication of the second cause of action for negligence. These facts are supported by admissible evidence and establish a prima facie case that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This shifts the burden of proof to Plaintiff to provide admissible evidence establishing a triable issue of fact that a dangerous condition existed and/or the employees of Defendant were negligent in failing to take some manner of corrective action.

Plaintiff concedes that Facts 1, 5, 7, 12 and 13 are undisputed, but asserts that Facts 2-4, 6, 9-11 are disputed. Although Fact 2 [Plaintiff testified while he was unaware of the exact substance that was on the ground, he believed that the dangerous condition was caused by the floor being improperly waxed] is based on interrogatory responses, Plaintiff asserts that it is disputed, without citation to evidence, that Plaintiff was not asked during deposition what substance he believed he slipped on. Plaintiff's failure to identify admissible evidence establishing what was dangerous about the floor, or why it was improperly waxed, fail to create a triable issue of material fact. This Court finds Fact 2 to be undisputed.

Plaintiff attempts to controvert Fact 3 [The general room floor is waxed approximately once a month, typically on Fridays after the students have left to allow the wax to cure without anyone walking on it] with evidence that Defendant did not keep track of when the floor is waxed or cleaned. The fact that there were no records establishing the precise time the floor was waxed prior to the incident does not establish a triable issue of material fact as to whether there was something dangerous about the floor or that it was improperly waxed. This Court finds Fact 3 to be undisputed.

Plaintiff attempts to controvert Fact 4 [The general room floors are not waxed during the morning or during school because the District would need to wait for all of the students to go home before starting the process of waxing the floor] with evidence that Defendant did not keep track of when the floor is waxed or cleaned. The fact that there were no records establishing the precise time the floor was waxed prior to the incident, despite testimony that it is always waxed after the students leave the premises, does not establish a triable issue of material fact as to whether there was something dangerous about the floor or that it was improperly waxed. This Court finds Fact 4 to be undisputed.

**Plaintiff attempts to controvert Fact 6 [The custodial staff would coordinate with the then principal of the school site about waxing the general room floor to ensure that no sports or other activities were going on at the time] with evidence that Defendant did not keep track of when the floor is waxed or cleaned. The fact that there were no records establishing the precise time the floor was waxed prior to the incident, despite testimony that it is always waxed after the students leave the premises and when no sports or other activities were going on, does not establish a triable issue of material fact as to whether there was something dangerous about the floor or that it was improperly waxed. This Court finds Fact 6 to be undisputed.**

**Plaintiff attempts to controvert Fact 8 [Prior to the students being let into the general room, or gym, the student supervisors would inspect the floor for any spill or anything wet before letting the students into the gym] with evidence that Defendant did not have procedures regarding the inspection of the Eagle Dome floor to make sure it was properly cleaned after lunch. The fact that there were no formal procedure does not controvert evidence concerning the existence of a practice or create a triable issue of fact as to whether or not such an inspection was conducted on the day in question. Plaintiff has not established a triable issue of material fact as to whether there was something dangerous about the floor or that it was improperly waxed on the day in question. This Court finds Fact 8 to be undisputed.**

**Plaintiff attempts to controvert Fact 9 [Ms. Plascencia did not notice that the floors of the gym were slippery at all] with evidence that Ms. Plascencia wrote in her report following the floor that there was no water on the floor, during her deposition she admitted that she does not remember checking or investigation whether there was any liquid on the floor where Edgar fell. The fact that Ms. Plascencia did not recall checking or investigating does not contradict her statement that she did not notice that the floors were slippery and does not create a triable issue of fact as to whether there was any substance on the floor or whether the floor was slippery because there is no evidence of either. This Court finds Fact 9 to be undisputed.**

**Plaintiff attempts to controvert Fact 10 [Plaintiff has no evidence that the floor was slippery on the [sic] of his fall, instead he merely generically states that he slipped without identifying the supposed substance that caused him to slip] with evidence that when mopping the custodians spray water, as well as a neutral floor cleaner “which is like a mild detergent” on the floor and with evidence that Plaintiff also points to the floor being covered with a substance, and looking clean and shiny. The fact that the floor was mopped or was clean and shiny does not create a triable issue of material fact as to whether the floor was slippery or had some substance spilled on it, but to the contrary suggests that there was nothing on the floor other than the substance causing the shiny appearance. This Court finds Fact 10 to be undisputed.**

**Plaintiff attempts to controvert Fact 11 [Plaintiff has not offered any evidence of an actual dangerous condition including a low friction coefficient showing a dangerously slippery floor] with evidence that Plaintiff also points to the floor as being covered with a substance and looking clear and shiny. The fact that the floor looked clear and shiny is not evidence that it was dangerously slippery or that it was slippery at all. Plaintiff did not offer evidence that the entire floor was slippery, only that he slipped. This Court finds Fact 11 to be undisputed.**

Since Plaintiff has not offered admissible evidence creating a triable issue of material fact with regard to the First Cause of Action for dangerous condition on public property. Accordingly the motion for Summary Adjudication that the First Cause of Action is without merit is GRANTED.

Plaintiff concedes that facts 15-17, 21-22, 28 and 30 are undisputed but asserts that Facts 14, 18-20, 23-27, and 29 are disputed.

Plaintiff attempts to controvert Fact 14 [Plaintiff has asserted as the sole basis for the Districts duty in his negligent supervision cause of action as Education Code Section 44807 and California Code of Regulations Title 5 Section 5552] with evidence that Defendant also violated its own policies and that Defendant's policies dictates "the student to staff ratio shall not be more than 20 to 1 and that in violation of this policy there was only one staff member supervision the 39 students attending the after-school program at the time of Edgar's fall. Assuming for sake of argument that the failure to maintain a 20 to 1 ratio was negligent, Plaintiff has offered no evidence that such negligence was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury or that such negligence created a dangerous condition on public property. This Court finds Fact 14 to be undisputed.

Plaintiff attempts to controvert Fact 18 [Ms. Plascencia did not even know if there was a sound system in the general room, much less how to work the stereo system and was not operating the stereo system at the time of the fall] with evidence that the supervisor was playing music at the time of the accident and did not see the incident. Assuming for sake of argument that the operation of the music system was negligent, Plaintiff has offered no evidence that such negligence was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury or that such negligence created a dangerous condition on public property. This Court finds Fact 18 to be undisputed.

Plaintiff attempts to controvert Fact 19 [Plaintiff's entire claim that the floor was overly waxed is based on the fact that the floor was clear and shiny] with evidence that the entire floor was covered with a substance which did not have color. Assuming for sake of argument that the entire floor was covered with something that did not have color, Plaintiff has offered no evidence that such lack of color was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury or that lack of color created a dangerous condition on public property. This Court finds Fact 19 to be undisputed.

Plaintiff attempts to controvert Fact 20 [Plaintiff has not offered any evidence of an actual dangerous condition, including a low friction coefficient showing a dangerously slippery floor] with evidence that Plaintiff's expert determined that the floor was dangerously slippery. Defendant has filed evidentiary objections to the declaration of Zachary Moore on the grounds that (1) the opinion assumes facts not in evidence, i.e. that there was moisture on the floor. That objection is SUSTAINED. Mr. Moore also opines that the floor violated applicable industry standards but does not offer an opinion as to how the failure to meet industry standards was a proximate cause or the accident suffered by Plaintiff. This Court finds Fact 20 to be undisputed.

Plaintiff attempts to controvert Fact 23 (Same as Fact 8) [Prior to the students being let into the general room, or gym, the student supervisors would inspect the floor for any spill or anything wet before letting the students into the gym] with evidence that Defendant does not keep track of when the floor is waxed or cleaned. The fact that Defendant did not keep track of when the floor was waxed or cleaned does not controvert

**the fact that the floor was inspected before students were allowed into the room. This Court finds Fact 23 to be undisputed.**

**Plaintiff attempts to controvert Fact 24 (Same as Fact 9) [Ms. Plascencia did not notice that the floors of the gym were slippery at all] with evidence that Ms. Plascencia wrote in her report following the floor that there was no water on the floor, during her deposition she admitted that she does not remember checking or investigation whether there was any liquid on the floor where Edgar fell. The fact that Ms. Plascencia did not recall checking or investigating does not contradict her statement that she did not notice that the floors were slippery and does not create a triable issue of fact as to whether there was any substance on the floor or whether the floor was slippery because there is no evidence of either. This Court finds Fact 24 to be undisputed.**

**Plaintiff attempts to controvert Fact 25 (Same as Fact 10) [Plaintiff has no evidence that the floor was slippery on the [sic] of his fall, instead he merely generically states that he slipped without identifying the supposed substance that caused him to slip] with evidence that when mopping the custodians spray water, as well as a neutral floor cleaner “which is like a mild detergent” on the floor and with evidence that Plaintiff also points to the floor being covered with a substance, and looking clean and shiny. The fact that the floor was mopped or was clean and shiny does not create a triable issue of material fact as to whether the floor was slippery or had some substance spilled on it, but to the contrary suggests that there was nothing on the floor other than the substance causing the shiny appearance. This Court finds Fact 25 to be undisputed.**

**Plaintiff attempts to controvert Fact 26 (Same as Fact 3) [The general room floor is waxed approximately once a month, typically on Fridays after the students have left to allow the wax to cure without anyone walking on it] with evidence that Defendant did not keep track of when the floor is waxed or cleaned. The fact that there were no records establishing the precise time the floor was waxed prior to the incident does not establish a triable issue of material fact as to whether there was something dangerous about the floor or that it was improperly waxed. This Court finds Fact 26 to be undisputed.**

**Plaintiff attempts to controvert Fact 27 (Same as Fact 4) [There is never an occasion when the general room floors would be waxed during the morning or during school because the District would need to wait for all of the students to go home before starting the process of waxing the floor] with evidence that Defendant did not keep track of when the floor is waxed or cleaned. The fact that there were no records establishing the precise time the floor was waxed prior to the incident, despite testimony that it is always waxed after the students leave the premises, does not establish a triable issue of material fact as to whether there was something dangerous about the floor or that it was improperly waxed. This Court finds Fact 27 to be undisputed.**

**Plaintiff attempts to controvert Fact 29 (Same as Fact 6) [The custodial staff would coordinate with the then principal of the school site about waxing the general room floor to ensure that no sports or other activities were going on at the time] with evidence that Defendant did not keep track of when the floor is waxed or cleaned. The fact that there were no records establishing the precise time the floor was waxed prior to the incident, despite testimony that it is always waxed after the students leave the premises and when no sports or other activities were going on, does not establish a triable issue of material fact as to whether there was something dangerous about the floor or that it was improperly waxed. This Court finds Fact 29 to be undisputed.**



**Plaintiff proposes additional Facts 1-39. This Court has sustained the objections to the Declaration of Zachary Moore. The remaining additional facts do not create a triable issue of fact as to whether a dangerous condition existed or whether any negligence by Defendant was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury.**

**Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Adjudication that the Second Cause of Action for Negligent Supervision has no merit is GRANTED. Since Summary Adjudication of the First and Second Cause of Action has been granted, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.**

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA  
COUNTY OF MERCED

Mandatory Settlement Conference  
Judge Pro Tem Peter MacLaren  
Courtroom 8  
627 W. 21<sup>st</sup> Street, Merced

Wednesday, July 3, 2024  
9:00 a.m.

The following tentative rulings shall become the ruling of the court unless a party gives notice of intention to appear as follows:

1. You must call (209) 725-4111 to notify the court of your intent to appear.
2. You must give notice to all other parties before 4:00 p.m. of your intent to appear.

Per California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1), failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral argument. *Note:* Notifying Court Call (the court's telephonic appearance provider) of your intent to appear does not satisfy the requirement of notifying the court.

**IMPORTANT: Court Reporters will NOT be provided; parties wanting a hearing transcript must make their own arrangements.**

<b>Case No.</b>	<b>Title / Description</b>
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There are no Mandatory Settlement Conferences Scheduled

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA  
COUNTY OF MERCED

Limited Civil Calendar  
Commissioner David Foster  
Courtroom 9  
627 W. 21<sup>st</sup> Street, Merced

Wednesday, July 3, 2024  
10:00 a.m.

The following tentative rulings shall become the ruling of the court unless a party gives notice of intention to appear as follows:

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Per California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1), failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral argument. *Note:* Notifying Court Call (the court's telephonic appearance provider) of your intent to appear does not satisfy the requirement of notifying the court.

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Case No.	Title / Description
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21CV-01624	Velocity Investments LLC v. Yvette Villegas
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Order to Show Cause re: Notice of Settlement

**Appearance required to address why case should not be dismissed. A Notice of Settlement of Entire Action was filed on November 4, 2021, stating that a request for dismissal would be filed by June 14, 2024. No request for dismissal has been filed. (See Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1385(c).)**

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21CV-01650	Velocity Investments LLC v. Belen Mendoza
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Order to Show Cause re: Notice of Settlement

**Appearance required to address why case should not be dismissed. A Notice of Settlement of Entire Action was filed on November 3, 2021 stating that a request for dismissal would be filed by June 9, 2024. No request for dismissal has been filed. (See Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1385(c).)**

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24CV-01538 [Parties' names withheld pursuant to CCP § 1161.2(a)(1)]

Motion to Set Aside Dismissal

**Appearance required. Parties who wish to appear remotely must contact the clerk of the court at (209) 725-4111 to seek permission and arrange for a remote appearance.**

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24CV-01965 [Parties' names withheld pursuant to CCP § 1161.2(a)(1)]

Court Trial: Unlawful Detainer

**Appearance required. Parties who wish to appear remotely must contact the clerk of the court at (209) 725-4111 to seek permission and arrange for a remote appearance.**

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24CV-02717 [Parties' names withheld pursuant to CCP § 1161.2(a)(1)]

Court Trial: Unlawful Detainer

**Appearance required. Parties who wish to appear remotely must contact the clerk of the court at (209) 725-4111 to seek permission and arrange for a remote appearance.**

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA  
COUNTY OF MERCED

Ex Parte Matters  
Judge Pro Tem Peter MacLaren  
Courtroom 8  
627 W. 21<sup>st</sup> Street, Merced

Wednesday, July 3, 2024  
1:15 p.m.

The following tentative rulings shall become the ruling of the court unless a party gives notice of intention to appear as follows:

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2. You must give notice to all other parties before 4:00 p.m. of your intent to appear.

Per California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1), failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral argument. *Note:* Notifying Court Call (the court's telephonic appearance provider) of your intent to appear does not satisfy the requirement of notifying the court.

**IMPORTANT: Court Reporters will NOT be provided; parties wanting a hearing transcript must make their own arrangements.**

<b>Case No.</b>	<b>Title / Description</b>
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16CV-03050	<i>Jaime Vega, et al v Michael Turner et al:</i>
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Application for Order Shortening Time for hearing on Motion for Protective Order

**Appearances required. Parties who wish to appear remotely must contact the clerk of the court at (209) 725-4111 to seek permission and arrange for a remote appearance.**

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA  
COUNTY OF MERCED

Ex Parte Matters  
Commissioner David Foster  
Courtroom 9  
627 W. 21<sup>st</sup> Street, Merced

Wednesday, July 3, 2024  
1:15 p.m.

The following tentative rulings shall become the ruling of the court unless a party gives notice of intention to appear as follows:

1. You must call (209) 725-4111 to notify the court of your intent to appear.
2. You must give notice to all other parties before 4:00 p.m. of your intent to appear.

Per California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1), failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral argument. *Note:* Notifying Court Call (the court's telephonic appearance provider) of your intent to appear does not satisfy the requirement of notifying the court.

**IMPORTANT: Court Reporters will NOT be provided; parties wanting a hearing transcript must make their own arrangements.**

<b>Case No.</b>	<b>Title / Description</b>
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There are no ex parte matters scheduled.

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA  
COUNTY OF MERCED

Ex Parte Matters  
Hon. Jennifer O. Trimble  
Courtroom 12  
1159 G Street, Los Banos

Wednesday, July 3, 2024  
1:15 p.m.

The following tentative rulings shall become the ruling of the court unless a party gives notice of intention to appear as follows:

1. You must call (209) 725-4111 to notify the court of your intent to appear.
2. You must give notice to all other parties before 4:00 p.m. of your intent to appear.

Per California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1), failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral argument. *Note:* Notifying Court Call (the court's telephonic appearance provider) of your intent to appear does not satisfy the requirement of notifying the court.

**IMPORTANT: Court Reporters will NOT be provided; parties wanting a hearing transcript must make their own arrangements.**

<b>Case No.</b>	<b>Title / Description</b>
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There are no ex parte matters scheduled.

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA  
COUNTY OF MERCED

Limited Civil Long Cause Court Trials  
Commissioner David Foster  
Courtroom 9  
627 W. 21<sup>st</sup> Street, Merced

Wednesday, July 3, 2024  
1:30 p.m.

The following tentative rulings shall become the ruling of the court unless a party gives notice of intention to appear as follows:

1. You must call (209) 725-4111 to notify the court of your intent to appear.
2. You must give notice to all other parties before 4:00 p.m. of your intent to appear.

Per California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1), failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral argument. *Note:* Notifying Court Call (the court's telephonic appearance provider) of your intent to appear does not satisfy the requirement of notifying the court.

**IMPORTANT: Court Reporters will NOT be provided; parties wanting a hearing transcript must make their own arrangements.**

<b>Case No.</b>	<b>Title / Description</b>
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There are no cases set for hearing.

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